Nicolas Pastrian

CONTACT INFORMATION

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, University of Pittsburgh	2024 (expected)
M.A. in Economics, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile	2015
B.A. in Economics and Business, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile	2014

RESEARCH INTEREST

Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Market Design, Industrial Organization, Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Public Economics

TEACHING INTEREST

Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Behavioral Economics, Public Economics

JOB MARKET PAPER

Product Line Design with Frictions

WORKING PAPERS

Full Surplus Extraction and Consideration Sets

WORK IN PROGRESS

Reforming Auctions with Behavioral Bidders

Regional Disparities in State Capacity and Voting for Decentralization Reforms (with Martin Besfamille and Amedeo Piolatto)

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant

Martín Besfamille, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile	2016-2018
Nicolás Figueroa, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile	2016-2018

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, University of Pittsburgh

Economic Modeling Skill	Fall 2023
Intermediate Microeconomics	Summer 2023
Game Theory	Summer 2021, Summer 2022

Teaching Assistant, University of Pittsburgh

Advanced Microeconomic Theory II (Ph.D.)	Spring 2023
Intermediate Microeconomics	Spring 2021
Introduction to Microeconomic Theory	Spring 2020, Fall 2020, Fall 2022
Advanced Microeconomic Theory I (Ph.D.)	Fall 2019

Instructor, Universidad Adolfo Ibañez (Chile)

Principles of Economics, Microeconomics	2018

Teaching Assistant, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile **2013-2017**
Graduate: Microeconomic Theory II, Macroeconomic Theory I
Undergraduate: Microeconomics I, Microeconomics II, Macroeconomics I, Topics on Applied Microeconomics, Principles of Microeconomics, Principles of Economics

PRESENTATIONS

2023: Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference (poster), 34th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, SECHI 2023 (Chile), Pitt Theory Brownbag

2022: Pitt Theory Brownbag, 1st Symposium of Graduate Students at Universidad Central de Chile, Pitt Economics Medley (poster), 36th Annual Conference of Pennsylvania Economic Association, INFORMS Revenue Management and Pricing Conference, ACM Conference on Economics & Computation (poster), 33rd Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory

2021: Pitt Theory Brownbag, Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference (poster), 32nd Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory (poster), Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Economics Alumni Workshop

2020: Pitt Theory Brownbag

FELLOWSHIPS & AWARDS

Social Science Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh	2021-2022
Becas Chile grant, Government of Chile	2020-2022
Summer Fellowship, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh	2020
Reuben Slesinger Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh	2018-2019

OTHERS

Language: Spanish (native), English (fluent)

Programming: LaTeX, Matlab, Julia, Python, R, Stata, Mathematica, SQL (basic), SAS (basic)

Citizenship: Chile (F-1 Visa)

REFERENCES

Luca Rigotti (co-chair)
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RESEARCH ABSTRACTS

Product Line Design with Frictions (Job Market Paper) [link]

We study a monopolist's product line design problem with search frictions. Consumers only evaluate a random subset of price-quality pairs in the menu, limiting the monopolist's ability to perfectly match contracts to consumer types. This creates a tradeoff faced when expanding the product line between extracting more rents from different consumer types and increased search costs. We show that when consumers are limited to seeing a single random contract out of the menu, then the optimal menu for the monopolist always contains a single offer. When consumers observe more than one offer, we show that a balanced menu with two contracts that are seen by a consumer with the same probability is never optimal. The monopolist rather has an incentive to "bias" the menu so that one of the offers is observed more often. Using an unbalanced menu has an impact on the quality provided to low valuation consumers, either reinforcing or reducing the distortions generated by asymmetric information. We discuss the consequences on quality provision, as well as the welfare effects of these distortions.

Full Surplus Extraction and Consideration Sets [link]

We analyze the surplus extraction problem in a mechanism design setting with consideration sets. We study a bounded rationality version of a general mechanism design environment with correlation in which the agent evaluates only a subset of types as possible deviations. We call these subsets the agent's consideration sets. We identify the inverse consideration sets as the key elements that determine whether full extraction is feasible in this setting and characterize the conditions beliefs need to satisfy to guarantee full surplus extraction. These conditions require the beliefs of each type to be separated from the beliefs of types in his inverse consideration set only. This relaxes the independence condition in Crémer and McLean (1988), which remains sufficient in our setting. Finally, we discuss some applications and limitations of our model.